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Abstract
In this paper, we assume that a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint
itself depends on relative income, which implies status. This constraint
means that agents with higher income are more creditworthy and can
make purchases with fewer money holdings. Under this assumption,
we construct a one-sector neoclassical growth model and show that
there exists a unique steady state that has saddle-path stability with-
out specifying each function. Furthermore, we examine the e®ects of
money growth on capital accumulation. If the status elasticity of CIA
constraint is large, the Tobin e®ect can arise. In contrast, if it is small,
the anti-Tobin e®ect can arise.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing macroeconomic literature that examines the e®ects of
in°ation (money growth) on capital accumulation. Tobin (1965) regards
money as a substitute for capital and concludes that money growth accel-
erates capital accumulation, known as the Tobin e®ect. Thereafter, many
studies have discussed the e®ects of money growth in the context of cash-
in-advance (CIA henceforth) constraints. For example, Clower (1967) and
Lucas (1980) show that if the CIA constraint applies only to consumption,
then money growth has no e®ect on capital accumulation in the long run,
known as the superneutrality of money. On the other hand, Stockman (1981)
considers a standard neoclassical growth model with the CIA constraint ap-
plying to both consumption and investment, and shows that money growth
decreases capital accumulation. This is because after a period of high in°a-
tion the net rate of return on capital falls. In this case, the level of capital
and the money growth rate are negatively correlated. This is referred to as
the anti-Tobin e®ect.
Recent studies on neoclassical growth models with CIA constraints cap-
ture the role of status in terms of a social device providing priority in the
nonmarket good sector, seen in Cole et al. (1992).1 For example, Chang
et al. (2000), Gong and Zou (2001), and Chang and Tsai (2003) intro-
duce status, de¯ned as capital holdings, into preferences and obtain sig-
ni¯cant results concerning the e®ects of money growth on the steady-state
level of capital.2 Under the Clower-Lucas-type CIA constraint, Chang et
al. (2000) con¯rm that money growth and the steady-state level of capital
are positively correlated. This is because higher in°ation increases the cost
of money holdings, so that the agent shifts his/her assets from money to
capital, which provides utility. On the other hand, Gong and Zou (2001)
employ the Stockman-type CIA constraint and show that whether money
growth promotes capital accumulation or not depends on the measure of
the agent's desire for status.3 In a similar vein, Chang and Tsai (2003) ¯nd
that when the status seeking e®ect dominates the in°ation tax e®ect, money
growth and the steady-state capital stock are positively correlated under the
1Zou (1994) interprets utility from capital in terms of the spirit of capitalism, based
on Weber (1958), and shows that endogenous growth can arise even if the interest rate is
smaller than the time preference rate.
2This type of preferences had already been constructed mathematically by Kurz (1968).
3Gong and Zou (2001) analyze the e®ects of money growth in the case of the Clower-
Lucas-type CIA constraint and that of the Stockman-type CIA constraint. Under the
Clower-Lucas-type CIA constraint, Gong and Zou (2001) obtain the same results as in
Chang et al. (2000).
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general-type CIA constraint, which means that whole consumption and a
positive fraction of investment are purchased using real money balances.
In this paper, on the other hand, we capture status in terms of social
credibility when making purchases. Speci¯cally, we embody this concept
by assuming that individuals with higher income (higher status) are more
creditworthy and can make purchases with fewer money holdings. This
setting can be supported by empirical studies: Avery et al. (1987) show
that high income individuals use cash and cash plus checks for a smaller
fraction of their total transactions than low income individuals; and Wol®
(1983), Kessler and Wol® (1991), and Kennickell and Starr-McCluer (1996)
¯nd that the fraction of household wealth held in liquid assets decreases
with income and wealth. Hence, we assume that the CIA constraint itself
depends on relative income, which implies status (hereafter this constraint is
referred to as the \CIA-status constraint"). In the present study, we consider
a neoclassical growth model with such a CIA-status constraint, which applies
to consumption and a fraction of investment, under this setting we clarify
how status has an impact on the relationship between the rate of money
growth and the steady-state level of capital, as well as a uniqueness of the
steady state and its stability.
As a result of this paper, we show that there exists a unique steady state
that has saddle-path stability without specifying each function.4 In addi-
tion, the e®ect of money growth on capital stock changes from negative to
positive when the status elasticity of the CIA constraint exceeds the fraction
of the liquidity constraint applying to investment expenditure. The intuition
is explained through the two e®ects, that is, the status enhancement e®ect
and the in°ation tax e®ect. The former e®ect, which can be captured by
the status elasticity of the CIA constraint, arises when the agent invests
more in order to make the CIA constraint less restricted. On the other
hand, the latter e®ect, which can be measured by the fraction of the liquid-
ity constraint applying to investment expenditure, occurs when the agent
purchases investment goods. If the status enhancement e®ect is su±ciently
small (resp. large), the agent attempts to invest less (resp. more) after the
policy of raising money growth. This is because the bene¯t of holding addi-
tional capital stock generated from the status enhancement e®ect is smaller
(resp. greater) than the cost of purchasing investment goods caused by the
in°ation tax e®ect. Thus, a rise in the rate of money growth depresses (resp.
4Although the existing studies on status preferences mentioned above show that there
may exist multiple steady states, they focus only on a steady state that has saddle-path
stability.
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accelerates) capital accumulation.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains
the CIA-status constraint in detail and provides the basic framework. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the e®ects of the changes in the status elasticity of the CIA
constraint and that in the rate of money growth on capital stock and con-
sumption. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 CIA-status constraint
In this paper, we impose a CIA constraint, which itself depends on relative
income. We here regard relative income as status. We introduce the ratio
of goods which require cash to goods which may require cash, and denote
this ratio by ­. Taking the observations mentioned in the Introduction
into consideration, we assume that ­ depends on the agent's credit when
making purchases | the agent's own relative income | and that ­ lies in
(0; 1) along the lines of the standard CIA model:
0 < ­
µ
y
¹y
¶
< 1; (1)
where y and ¹y are private income and average income in the economy re-
spectively, and y=¹y stands for the agent's own relative income. In addition
to (1), we posit that ­(¢) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave with
respect to y=¹y:
­0
µ
y
¹y
¶
< 0; ­00
µ
y
¹y
¶
> 0: (2)
We now construct the CIA constraint employed in this paper. From the
de¯nition of ­(¢), we ¯nd that
Lc
L
= ­
µ
y
¹y
¶
; (3)
where L and Lc are goods which may require cash and goods which require
cash to purchase, respectively. Goods which may require cash are de¯ned as
L ´ c+ xi; (4)
5The results of this paper are di®erent from those of Gong and Zou (2001) and Chang
and Tsai (2003) in that we provide the condition for the Tobin or the anti-Tobin e®ect by
using the parameters not in preferences but in the CIA-status constraint.
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where c is consumption, i is investment, and x, which lies in [0; 1], represents
the fraction of the liquidity constraint applying to investment expenditure.
Concerning goods which require cash to purchase, Lc, the following con-
straint holds from the de¯nition:
m ¸ Lc; (5)
where m is real money balances de¯ned as nominal money balances divided
by the price level. From (3), (4) and (5), we have
m ¸ ­
µ
y
¹y
¶
(c+ xi): (6)
2.2 Optimal conditions and dynamic system
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of identical, in¯nite-lived agents
endowed with a unit of labor. The size of the population is constant and is
normalized to unity. Each agent consumes a continuum of non-perishable
consumption goods produced with a simple neoclassical production technol-
ogy. We assume that each consumption good is perfectly complementary.
The representative agent maximizes the following lifetime utility:Z 1
0
u(c(t))e¡µtdt; (7)
where u(¢) is an instantaneous utility function which satis¯es u0(¢) > 0,
u00(¢) < 0 and the Inada conditions (limc!0 u0(c) = 1, limc!1 u0(c) = 0).
In addition, µ is the rate of time preference.
The budget constraint of the representative agent is
_m(t) = f(k(t))¡ c(t)¡ i(t)¡ ¼(t)m(t) + ¿(t); (8)
where ¼ is the rate of in°ation and k is capital stock. Output is produced
using a neoclassical production function, f(¢), satisfying f 0(¢) > 0, f 00(¢) < 0
and the Inada conditions (limk!0 f 0(k) = 1, limk!1 f 0(k) = 0). The law
of motion of capital stock is given by
_k(t) = i(t): (9)
For simplicity, the depreciation rate of capital is assumed to be zero. In (8),
¿ is the seigniorage that the agent receives from the monetary authority as
a lump-sum transfer:
¿(t) = Ám(t); (10)
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where Á is the constant, time-invariant money growth rate. By using Á, the
nominal money supply, M , is expressed as
M(t) = M(0)eÁt ; given M(0) > 0: (11)
Assuming a representative agent and a neoclassical technology, from (6),
we ¯nd that the CIA-status constraint becomes
m ¸ ­
µ
f(k(t))
f(¹k(t))
¶
(c+ xi): (12)
The representaive agent maximises (7) subject to (8), (9) and (12). In
what follows, we drop the time index from the endogenous variables. To
derive the necessary conditions for an optimum, we set up the following
current-value Hamiltonian function:
H = u(c) + ¸
£
f(k)¡ c¡ i¡ ¼m+ ¿¤+ ¹£ i ¤+ ´ ·m¡ ­µf(k)
f(¹k)
¶
(c+ xi)
¸
;
where ¸ and ¹ are the shadow prices of real money balances and the capital
stock, respectively, and ´ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
CIA-status constraint (12). The ¯rst-order conditions for optimization are
given as follows:
u0(c) = ¸+ ´­
µ
f(k)
f(¹k)
¶
; (13a)
¹ = ¸+ x´­
µ
f(k)
f(¹k)
¶
; (13b)
_¹ = µ¹¡ ¸f 0(k) + ´­0
µ
f(k)
f(¹k)
¶
f 0(k)
f(¹k)
(c+ xi); (13c)
_¸ = ¸(¼ + µ)¡ ´: (13d)
and the transversality conditions for k and m are
lim
t!1 e
¡µt¹k = 0; (14)
lim
t!1 e
¡µt¸m = 0: (15)
Equation (13a) implies that the marginal utility of consumption equals the
marginal cost of consumption, which is the marginal utility of having an
additional unit of real money balances. Equations (13b) and (13c) together
describe that the evolution of capital over time, where the last term on
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the left-hand side in (13c) represents the marginal bene¯t from the higher
income position (i.e. higher status). This bene¯t implies that the agent
gets relatively higher credibility and can make purchases with fewer money
holdings. Equation (13d) implies that the marginal value of real money
balances equals the marginal cost.
Since the agents are assumed to be symmetric and the size of the popu-
lation is unity, in equilibrium the level of the agent's capital stock is equal
to the average level of capital stock in the economy:
k = ¹k: (16)
Additionally, in equilibrium the goods market clears, and money demand is
equal to money supply:
_k = f(k)¡ c; (17)
_m = (Á¡ ¼)m: (18)
We assume that the CIA constraint is always binding in equilibrium, as is
common in the CIA literature. Thus, from (12) and (16) we get
m = ­(1)(c+ xi): (19)
From (9) and (13a)-(19), we obtain the following dynamic system:6
_c = ¡D¡1
"
(1¡ x)
(
¸
Ã
Á¡ xf
0(k) _k
xf(k) + (1¡ x)c
!
¡ (u
0(c)¡ ¸)
­(1)
)
+¸f 0(k)¡ µxu0(c) + »(u0(c)¡ ¸) fxf(k) + (1¡ x)cg f
0(k)
f(k)
¸
;
(20a)
_¸ = µ¸¡ (u
0(c)¡ ¸)
­(1)
+ ¸
(
Á¡ xf
0(k) _k + (1¡ x) _c
xf(k) + (1¡ x)c
)
; (20b)
_k = f(k)¡ c; (20c)
where
D ´
½
xu00(c)¡ (1¡ x)
2¸
xf(k) + (1¡ x)c
¾
< 0;
» ´ ¡­
0(1)
­(1)
> 0:
Note that » expresses the elasticity of the CIA constraint with respect to
status.7
6See Appendix A.1 for the derivation of the dynamic system.
7In what follows, » is referred to as the status elasticity of the CIA constraint.
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2.3 Steady state and stability
In this subsection, we consider a steady state and its stability. In a steady
state, the economy is characterized by _c = _¸ = _k (= _m) = 0. We then
obtain
f 0(k) = µ + (µ + Á)­(1)
·
xµ ¡ » fxf(k) + (1¡ x)cg f
0(k)
f(k)
¸
; (21a)
f(k) = c: (21b)
Equation (21a) states that when the CIA constraint itself depends on status
(» > 0), the steady-state level of capital is not determined only by the
constant rate of time preference (i.e. the modi¯ed golden rule (f 0(k) = µ)
does not hold), even if the CIA constraint applies only to consumption
(x = 0). In this case, the level of capital hinges on money growth, that is,
the superneutrality of money is not valid. In the next section, we conduct
the analysis concerning the e®ects of changes in the status elasticity of the
CIA constraint and that of money growth on capital stock and consumption.
From (21a) and (21b), we have
f 0(k¤) =
f1 + x(µ + Á)­(1)g µ
1 + »(µ + Á)­(1)
: (22)
Since the right-hand side of (22) is constant and the production function,
f(¢), satis¯es concavity and the Inada conditions, we have a unique solu-
tion, k¤, which represents the steady-state level of capital. Additionally,
substituting k¤ into (21b) yields the steady-state level of consumption, c¤.
Next, we consider the stability of the steady state. Linearizing the dy-
namic system (20a)-(20c) around the steady state, we obtain the following
relationships between the three characteristic roots, g1, g2 and g3:8
g1 + g2 + g3 = ¡(1¡ x)»f
0(k¤)u0(c¤)
D¤f(k¤)
+
(f 0(k¤) + Á)u00(c¤)
D¤
½
1
(µ + Á)­(1)
+ x
¾
> 0; (23a)
g1g2g3 = ¡f
0(k¤)f 00(k¤)u0(c¤)
D¤­(1)
< 0; (23b)
where
D¤ ´
·
xu00(c¤)¡ (1¡ x)
2u0(c¤)
f1 + (µ + Á)­(1)g f(k¤)
¸
< 0:
8See Appendix A.2 for the linearization of the dynamic system.
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Equations (23a) and (23b) together indicate that the dynamic system has
one negative and two positive eigenvalues. Since consumption, c, and the
shadow price of real money balances, ¸, are jumpable variables and capi-
tal stock, k, is a state variable, the steady state exhibits the saddle-point
stability.
Proposition 1. In a neoclassical growth model in which status is in-
corporated into the CIA constraint, there exists a unique steady state that is
saddle-path stable.
3 E®ects on capital stock and consumption
3.1 Changes in the status elasticity of the CIA constraint
From (21b) and (22), we can show that changes in the status elasticity of
the CIA constraint positively a®ect both the steady-state level of capital
stock and that of consumption:
dk¤
d»
= ¡f1 + x(µ + Á)­(1)g µ(µ + Á)­(1)f1 + »(µ + Á)­(1)g2 f 00(k¤) > 0; (24a)
dc¤
d»
= ¡f1 + x(µ + Á)­(1)g µ(µ + Á)­(1)f
0(k¤)
f1 + »(µ + Á)­(1)g2 f 00(k¤) > 0: (24b)
Note that when the CIA constraint is more elastic with respect to status, the
e®ect of holding additional capital stock on the relaxation of the CIA con-
straint becomes larger. Because of this, the bene¯t of investment becomes
higher through status enhancement. Therefore, an increase in the status
elasticity of the CIA constraint induces greater demand for investment, so
that the steady-state level of capital increases. Consequently, it follows that
output and consumption increase in the long run.
3.2 E®ects of money growth
In this subsection, we clarify how money growth a®ects the steady-state
level of capital stock and that of consumption in our framework.
From (21b) and (22), we have
dk¤
dÁ
= ¡ (» ¡ x)µ­(1)f1¡ (µ + Á)­0(1)g2 f 00(k¤) ; (25a)
dc¤
dÁ
= ¡ (» ¡ x)µ­(1)f
0(k¤)
f1¡ (µ + Á)­0(1)g2 f 00(k¤) : (25b)
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Equations (25a) and (25b) indicate that when the status elasticity of the
CIA constraint, », is greater (resp. smaller) than the fraction of investment
expenditure ¯nanced by real money balances, x, an increase in the rate of
money growth, Á, induces an increase (resp. a decrease) in capital stock
and an increase (resp. a decrease) in consumption. The positive (resp.
negative) relationship between the rate of money growth and capital stock
can be considered as the presence of the Tobin (resp. the anti-Tobin) e®ect.
Additionally, when » = x, money growth has no impact on capital stock and
consumption, that is, the superneutrality of money holds.
These results can be interpreted through the relationship between the
bene¯t of holding additional capital stock and the cost of purchasing invest-
ment goods. Here, the bene¯t is generated from the status enhancement
e®ect, which arises when the agent makes the CIA constraint less restricted
by investing more. This bene¯t can be captured through the parameter ».
On the other hand, the cost is caused by the in°ation tax e®ect, which oc-
curs when the agent purchases investment goods after the policy of raising
money growth induces higher in°ation. This cost can be measured by the
parameter x.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that the economy is in the steady
state initially, and that the rate of money growth rises. When » > x, the
status enhancement e®ect dominates the in°ation tax e®ect. At that time,
the bene¯t of holding additional capital stock generated from the status
enhancement e®ect is greater than the cost of purchasing investment goods
caused by the in°ation tax e®ect. Thus, the net rate of return on capital
in utility (consumption) terms will increase.9 Then, the agent shifts his/her
demand from consumption to capital stock in order to enhance his/her status
and to make the CIA constraint less restricted.10 As a result, a rise in the
money growth rate promotes capital accumulation, which leads to a rise in
output and that in consumption in the long run.
In contrast, when » < x, the in°ation tax e®ect dominates the status
enhancement e®ect. Then, the bene¯t of holding additional capital stock
generated from the status enhancement e®ect is smaller than the cost of
purchasing investment goods caused by the in°ation tax e®ect. Therefore,
9Actually, as the third e®ect, there is the in°ation tax e®ect on purchasing current
and future consumption goods. When » = x = 0, we can extract only this third e®ect.
However, Stockman (1981) focuses on this case and shows that the net rate of return on
capital in utility (consumption) terms is una®ected by higher in°ation. Thus, we ignore
this third e®ect.
10Note that the agent obtains the higher net rate of return on capital by investing more
and enhancing his/her status.
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the net rate of return on capital in utility terms will decrease, so that the
agent shifts the demand from capital stock to consumption. Thus, an in-
crease in money growth depresses the steady-state level of capital, which
leads to a decrease in output and that in consumption in the long run.
Finally, when » = x, the status enhancement e®ect and the in°ation
tax e®ect cancel each other out. Then, the net rate of return on capital in
utility terms does not change. In this case, there is no demand shift between
capital stock and consumption. Namely, accelerating money growth has no
e®ect on the steady-state level of either capital stock or consumption.
Proposition 2. In a neoclassical growth model in which status is incor-
porated into the CIA constraint, if the status elasticity of the CIA constraint
is greater (smaller) than the fraction of the investment expenditure ¯nanced
by real money balances (i.e. » > (<)x), then a rise in the money growth
rate increases (decreases) the steady-state level of capital and that of con-
sumption. If » = x, then the superneutrality of money still holds.
4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated a neoclassical growth model with a CIA con-
straint which itself depends on relative income, which implies status. This
CIA constraint means that agents with higher income are more creditworthy
and can make purchases with fewer money holdings. Under this assumption,
we have examined how status, which a®ects the CIA constraint, has an im-
pact on the relationships between money growth and both capital stock and
consumption, as well as a uniqueness of the steady state and its stability.
Under the CIA-status constraint, we have shown that (i) there exists a
unique steady state that has saddle-path stability without specifying each
function, and (ii) the Tobin or the anti-Tobin e®ect or the superneutral-
ity of money arise depending on the degree of status elasticity of the CIA
constraint. Especially, when the status elasticity of the CIA constraint is
greater than the fraction of investment expenditure ¯nanced by real money
balances, the agent shifts his/her demand from consumption to capital stock
after the policy of raising money growth induces higher in°ation. This is
because the bene¯t of holding additional capital stock generated from the
status enhancement e®ect is greater than the cost of purchasing investment
goods caused by the in°ation tax e®ect in this case. Through this process,
the higher money growth rate leads to an increase in the steady-state level
of capital and that of consumption.
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Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the dynamic system
This appendix presents the derivations of the dynamic system (20a)-
(20c).
Taking the logarithms of both sides of (19) and di®erentiating them with
respect to time, we have
_m
m
=
xf 0(k) _k + (1¡ x) _c
xf(k) + (1¡ x)c : (26)
From (13a), (13d) and (18), it follows that
_¸ = µ¸¡ (u
0(c)¡ ¸)
­(1)
+ ¸
µ
Á¡ _m
m
¶
: (27)
Substituting (26) into (27), we obtain (20b).
Next, combining (13a) and (13b) gives
¹ = xu0(c) + (1¡ x)¸: (28)
Di®erentiating (28) with respect to time, we have
_¹ = xu00(c) _c+ (1¡ x) _¸ : (29)
From (9), (13c), (16), (17), (28) and (29), we obtain
xu00(c) _c = ¡
h
¸f 0(k) + (1¡ x)( _¸ ¡ µ¸)¡ µxu0(c)
+»(u0(c)¡ ¸)f
0(k)
f(k)
fxf(k) + (1¡ x)cg
¸
: (30)
Combining (20b) and (30) yields (20a).
Since (20a), (20b) and (20c) include only c, ¸ and k, they constitute the
full of dynamics of c, ¸ and k.
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A.2 Linearization around the steady state
Linearizing the dynamic system represented by (20a)-(20c) around the
steady state, we obtain266664
_c
_k
_¸
377775 =
2666664
@ _c
@c
@ _c
@k
@ _c
@¸
@ _k
@c
@ _k
@k
@ _k
@¸
@ _¸
@c
@ _¸
@k
@ _¸
@¸
3777775
266664
c¡ c¤
k ¡ k¤
¸¡ ¸¤
377775 ; (31)
where each element of the coe±cient matrix is
@ _c
@c
= ¡(D¤)¡1
·
(1¡ x)f 0(k¤) fx¸¤ + »(u0(c¤)¡ ¸¤)g
f(k¤)
¡f(1¡ x) + (»f
0(k¤)¡ xµ)­(1)gu00(c¤)
­(1)
¸
;
@ _c
@k
= ¡(D¤)¡1
·
f»u0(c¤) + (1¡ »)¸¤gf 00(k¤)
¡(1¡ x)fx¸
¤ + »(u0(c¤)¡ ¸¤)gff 0(k¤)g2
f(k¤)
¸
;
@ _c
@¸
= ¡(D¤)¡1
·
(1¡ x)(1 + Á­(1))
­(1)
+ (1¡ »)f 0(k¤)
¸
;
@ _k
@c
= ¡1;
@ _k
@k
= f 0(k¤);
@ _k
@¸
= 0;
@ _¸
@c
=
x¸¤f 0(k¤)
f(k¤)
¡ u
00(c¤)
­(1)
¡ (1¡ x)¸
¤
f(k¤)
¢ @ _c
@c
;
@ _¸
@k
= ¡x¸
¤ff 0(k¤)g2
f(k¤)
¡ (1¡ x)¸
¤
f(k¤)
¢ @ _c
@k
;
@ _¸
@¸
= µ + Á+
1
­(1)
¡ (1¡ x)¸
¤
(1¡ x)c¤ + xf(k¤) ¢
@ _c
@¸
:
Note that TrJ and DetJ (J is the coe±cient matrix in (31)) are equal
to g1 + g2 + g3, and g1g2g3, respectively.
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